Capacity Cjoices and Price Competition in Experimental Market
Abstract
In the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the experimental data, given capacities, observed price setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Capacities converge above the Cournot level. Sellers rarely manage to cooperate.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Flinders of South Australia - Discipline of Economics in its series Papers with number 179.Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:flinde:179
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THE FLINDERS UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, DISCIPLINE OF ECONOMICS, BEDFORD PARK, S.A. 5042 ADELAIDE AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://www.flinders.edu.au/sabs/business/
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: PRICING ; COMPETITION ; ECONOMIC MODELS;Other versions of this item:
- Vital Anderhub & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke & Hans-Theo Normann, 2003. "Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 27-52, June.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Andreas Nicklisch, 2008. "Semi-collusive advertising and pricing in experimental duopolies," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- David Goodwin & Stuart Mestelman, 2003.
"Advance Production Duopolies and Posted Prices or Market-Clearing Prices,"
McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications
2003-04, McMaster University.
- David Goodwin & Stuart Mestelman, 2002. "Advance Production Duopolies and Posted Prices or Market-Clearing Prices," Department of Economics Working Papers 2002-07, McMaster University.
- Goodwin, David & Mestelman, Stuart, 2010. "A note comparing the capacity setting performance of the Kreps-Scheinkman duopoly model with the Cournot duopoly model in a laboratory setting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 522-525, September.
- Dean V. Williamson & Céline Jullien & Lynne Kiesling & Carine Staropoli, 2006. "Investment Incentives and Market Power: An Experimental Analysis," EAG Discussions Papers 200605, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
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