Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power (and the possibility thereof) are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes.
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Paper provided by University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
98/09.
Length: 41 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:exetec:98/09
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Phone: (01392) 263218 Fax: (01392) 263242 Web page: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/sobe/ More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification: D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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