We built a simple alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" they are bargaining over. The unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.
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Paper provided by University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
96/17.
Length: 9 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:exetec:96/17
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Phone: (01392) 263218 Fax: (01392) 263242 Web page: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/sobe/ More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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