The Analysis of the determinants of union membership has typically met difficulties with the free-rider problem that union membership is not individually-rational. We assume that workers differ in their reservation wages and hence in their choice of contracts, preventing free-riding on the contarct choice of others.
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Paper provided by University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
96/12.
Length: 21 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:exetec:96/12
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Phone: (01392) 263218 Fax: (01392) 263242 Web page: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/sobe/ More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Torberg Falch & Bjarne Strøm, 2004.
"Wage Bargaining and Monopsony,"
Working Paper Series
4304, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
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