This paper addresses the issue of selecting pricing institutions in a bilateral monopoly. Suppose a bayer and seller can benefit from exchanging one unit of a good. The selelr is entitled to select the pricing institution. He can either make a take-it-leave-it offer or enter a bargaining game.
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Paper provided by University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
96/03.
Length: 16 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:exetec:96/03
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Phone: (01392) 263218 Fax: (01392) 263242 Web page: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/sobe/ More information through EDIRC