This note argues that when two countries choose optimal tariffs in a trade war, specific tariffs are not equivalent to ad valorem tariffs even if all markets are competitive. In particular, it shows that if a country's trading partener switches a specific tariff to an an valorem tariff that yields the same revenue at the initial trade point, the former country has an incentive to lower its tariffs.
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Paper provided by University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
96/02.
Length: 9 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:exetec:96/02
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU Phone: (01392) 263218 Fax: (01392) 263242 Web page: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/sobe/ More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification: F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Amrita Dhillon & Myrna H. Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2006.
"Tax Competition Reconsidered,"
Working Papers
0602, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
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