This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Poll Subsidy and Excise Tax

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Boyer, M.M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

It is well known that modern governments are unwilling to use poll taxes because it corresponds to political suicide. Still, poll taxes are allegedly the most efficient form of taxation. Building on Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Peck (1989), the goal of this paper is to show a case where an excise tax levied on a certain insurance service is preferred to a poll tax. The preference for an excise tax is such that it would be optimal for workers if the government set the excise tax so high as to be able to give lump-sum subsidies (i.e., a poll subsidy) to all workers in the economy.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 98-13.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:etcori:98-13

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Email:
Web page: http://www.hec.ca/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: ASYMETRIC INFORMATION ; TAXATION ; INSURANCE ; MORAL HAZARD;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.