In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many authors to the multi-period case.
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Length: 58 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:etcori:00-05
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
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