Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
AbstractIn this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many authors to the multi-period case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 00-05.
Length: 58 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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MONOPOLIES ; ADVERSE SELECTION ; INSURANCE;
Other versions of this item:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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