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The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud

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Author Info
Dionne, G.

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Abstract

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 00-04.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:etcori:00-04

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Postal: Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.
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Web page: http://www.hec.ca/
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; MORAL HAZARD ; INSURANCE;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models
G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

Cited by:
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  1. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anthony Miyazaki, 2009. "Perceived Ethicality of Insurance Claim Fraud: Do Higher Deductibles Lead to Lower Ethical Standards?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 589-598, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 0329, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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