The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud
AbstractWe discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. in its series Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- with number 00-04.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.
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INFORMATION ; MORAL HAZARD ; INSURANCE;
Other versions of this item:
- G. Dionne, 2000. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud," THEMA Working Papers 2000-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
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- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003.
"Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2009.
"Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud,"
INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 58-70, January.
- Dionne, Georges & Giuliano, Florence & Picard, Pierre, 2009. "Optimal auditing with scoring: theory and application to insurance fraud," MPRA Paper 18374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026, HAL.
- Anthony Miyazaki, 2009. "Perceived Ethicality of Insurance Claim Fraud: Do Higher Deductibles Lead to Lower Ethical Standards?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 589-598, July.
- Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Georges Dionne & Kili C. Wang, 2011. "Does Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile theft Insurance Fluctuate with the Business Cycle ?," Cahiers de recherche 1121, CIRPEE.
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