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The Policy Implications of the Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints

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Author Info
Rey, P
Caballero-Sanz, F

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the advantages and disadvantages of alternative treatments of vertical restraints in the framework of European competition policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) in its series European Economy - Economic Papers with number 119.

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Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:eeccco:119

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Commission of the European Communities. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, B- 1049 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: +32 2 299.35.78
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Web page: http://europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/
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Related research
Keywords: VERTICAL INTEGRATION EUROPE

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ana, MAULEON & José, SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bergès-Sennou, F. & Loss, F. & Malavoti, E. & Vergé, T., 2001. "Competition policy and agreements between firms," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 22, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
  3. Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2001. "Equilibrium Distribution Systems Under Retailers' Strategic Behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.