Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under gainsharing: Expanding Agency Theory Predictions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies in its series Papers with number 95-31.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S.A.; Cornell University. Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies, IRL School. Ithaca, NY 14653-3901
PROFIT SHARING; BEHAVIOUR; WORKERS; ENTERPRISES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J39 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Other
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.