Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising from the interest groups' lobby activity disables the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other words, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.
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Paper provided by Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark- in its series Papers with number
98-09.
Length: Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:clmsre:98-09
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