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Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms

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  • Randall S. Kroszner
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    Paper provided by Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State in its series University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State with number 158.

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    Date of creation: 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:fth:chices:158

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    Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CENTER FOR STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, 1101 E. 58TH STREET CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637.
    Web page: http://research.chicagobooth.edu/economy/
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    Cited by:
    1. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "The Political Economy of Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler, Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October.
    4. Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener, 2005. "Branch banking, bank competition, and financial stability," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2004. "The Political Economy of Dominant Investors," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-091/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Cécile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, 2003. "The Canadian and American Financial Systems: Competition and Regulation," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(4), pages 431-447, December.
    7. Gabriella Montinola & Ramon Moreno, 2001. "The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 2001-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    8. Guohua Feng & Apostolos Serletis, 2009. "Efficiency and productivity of the US banking industry, 1998-2005: evidence from the Fourier cost function satisfying global regularity conditions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(1), pages 105-138.
    9. Braun, Matias & Raddatz, Claudio, 2007. "Trade liberalization, capital account liberalization and the real effects of financial development," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 730-761, September.

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