On the Job Screening, Up or Out Rules, and Firm Growth
AbstractThis paper uses on-the-job screening to derive a stochastic and dynamic model of hiring, promotion, and dismissal policies, and their impact on total firm employment and output. The model provides an explanation of the up-or-out rule observed in many organizations. It also provides an explanation for a cost-of-adjustment mechanism for the stock of human capital in a firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Chicago - Economics Research Center in its series University of Chicago - Economics Research Center with number 90-11.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTER, NORC, CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637 U.S.A.
Web page: http://economics.uchicago.edu/research.shtml
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economic models ; employment ; enterprises;
Other versions of this item:
- Brendan O'Flaherty & Aloysius Siow, 1992. "On the Job Screening, up or out Rules, and Firm Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 346-68, May.
- O'Flaherty, B. & Siow, A., 1989. "On The Job Screening, Up Or Out Rules, And Firm Growth," Discussion Papers 1989_02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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- Black, Dan A. & Loewenstein, Mark A., 1997.
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- Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 2007. "Esteem and ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 373-383, July.
- Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012.
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- Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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