"Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods"
AbstractAs a feature of positive redistribution, what incentive causes those with the power of transferring wealth to stop short of extremes in confiscationand even to a degree to serve the interests of the powerless and the wider soviety as a whole? A beginning approach to this problem has been made by McGuire and Olson (1994, 1996) [hereafter "M-O"]. This paper constructs a simplified, comparative static version of Barro to enrich the M-O analysis of the positive political economy of redistribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 98-99-4.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION ; PUBLIC GOODS ; PUBLIC POLICY;
Other versions of this item:
- D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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