AbstractAlthough many complain that the clientele served by government programs routinely expands, there exists no analytic model with suggests how policy implementation may result in such growth. This paper shows that peer effects, where each bureaucrat compares his behavior or that of all others, can cause policy clientele to increase over time--what we label bureaucratic creep-- particularly when bureaucrats interact with many potential recipients.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 95-96-1.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
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