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Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument

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Author Info
Roemer, J.E.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs in its series Papers with number 95-04.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldav:95-04

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General
I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty

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  1. Benabou, Roland & Ok, Efe, 1997. "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution : the POUM Hypothesis," IDEI Working Papers 78, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Giacomo Corneo & Hans Peter Gruner, 2000. "Social Limits to Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1491-1507, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2005. "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 4952, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Raaj Sah & Philippe Renelle, 2003. "Class Struggle: Some Diluting effects of Inter-Generational Mobility," Working Papers 0301, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  5. Benabou, R., 1996. "Unequal Societies," Working Papers 96-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & John E. Roemer, 2000. "Endogenous Party Formation And The Effect Of Income Distribution On Policy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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