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Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance

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Author Info
Sheffrin, S.M.
Triest, R.K.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs in its series Papers with number 373.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1991
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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldav:373

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: taxes ; economic models ; taxpayers;

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  1. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June. [Downloadable!]
  2. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 2004. "Economic theory of tax compliance with special reference to tax compliance costs," Working Papers 04/13, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Laura Sour, 2004. "An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity," Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA, , vol. 0(1), pages 43-61, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  4. Torgler, Benno & Demir, Ihsan C. & Macintyre, Alison & Schaffner, Markus, 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Tax Morale: An Empirical Investigation," Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(2), pages 313-339, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2003. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Working Paper Series rwp03-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Social Interactions," Cahiers de recherche 0432, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Roger A. McCain, 2000. "Road Rage: Imitative Learning Of Self-Destructive Behavior In An Agent-Based Simulation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 270, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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