Welfarism And Axiomatic Bargainig Theory
AbstractConsider the domain of economic environments E whose typical element is Î¾ = (Uâ, Uâ, Î©, Ï*), where ui are Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, Î© is a set of lotteries on a fixed finite set of alternatives, and Ï Ïµ Î©. A mechanism f associates to each Î¾ a lottery f(Î¾) in Î©. Formulate the natural version of Nash's axioms, from his bargaining solution, for mechanisms on this domain, (e.g., IIA says that if Î¾ = (Uâ, Uâ, Î â Î©, and f â It is shown that the Nash axioms (Pareto, symmetry, IIA, invariance w. r. t. cardinal transformations of the utility functions) hardly restrict the behavior of the mechanism at all. In particular, for any integer M, choose M environments Î¾i, i = 1,..., M, and choose a Pareto optimal lottery Ïi â Î©i, restricted only so that no axiom is directly contradicted by these choices. Then there is a mechanism f for which f (Î¾i) = Ïi, which satisfies all the axioms, and is continuous on E.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs in its series Papers with number 351.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.
econometrics ; economic models ; social choice;
Other versions of this item:
- John E. ROEMER, 1990. "Welfarism and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1990032, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001.
"Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541 Elsevier.
- D'ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, . "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1564, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, EconWPA, revised 27 Nov 1996.
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