1. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, . "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," ELSE working papers 027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 753-70, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
6. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Farina, Francesco & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2007. "Cooperation as self-interested reciprocity in the Centipede," MPRA Paper 3701, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
2. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolotionary Dynamics," ELSE working papers 057, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics 6-98, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics.
   • Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination Of Weakly Dominated Strategies And Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
3. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
4. Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Giovanni Ponti, . "Splitting the Baby in Two: How to Solve Solomon's Dilemma when Agents are Boundedly Rational," University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics 20-98, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics.