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Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders

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Author Info
Neeman, Z.
Orosel, G.O.

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Abstract

We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. The buyers have the same ex post valuation of the object but differ in their estimates of what this value is.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 92.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostec:92

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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION AUCTIONS LEARNING

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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