Earmarking of Environmental Taxes: Efficient, After All

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Earmarking of Environmental Taxes: Efficient, After All

Author Info

Pirttila, J.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Jukka Pirttilä

Abstract

The paper analyses the benefits of earmarking the environmental tax revenues in a second-best world with asymmetry of information between government and taxpayers. Taxpayers are assumed to have taste differences over consumption of an environmentally harmful activity. The government, which cannot observe these preferences, pursues Pareto-efficient taxation involving compensation to the potential losers of tax policy. Within this framework, it is shown that earmarking environmental tax revenues on projects that are beneficial to the losers of the environmental policy may alleviate problems concerning asymmetric information and facilitate more efficient environmental policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Finland. Research Department. in its series Bank of Finland - Studies in Economics and Finance with number 4/98.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bfsefi:4/98

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Postal: Bank of Finland. Research Department. P.O. Box 160, FIN-00101, Helsinki, Finland.
Web page: http://www.bof.fi/
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Related research
Keywords: ENVIRONMENT ; TAXES;

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Pirttilä, Jukka, 1998. "Earmarking of Environmental Taxes: Efficient, After All," Research Discussion Papers 4/1998, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Brett, Craig & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 315-340, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robin Boadway, . "The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics," EPRU Working Paper Series 95-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Robin Boadway, 1994. "The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics," Working Papers 910, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 1997. "Price Subsidies versus Public Provision," Working Paper Series 1997:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, . "Price Subsidies versus Public Provision," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-08, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
Diamond, P. A., 1975. "A many-person Ramsey tax rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-342, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- P. A. Diamond, 1975. "A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule," Working papers 146, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
King, Mervyn A., 1986. "A pigovian rule for the optimum provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-291, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Shy, Oz & Tarkka, Juha, 1998. "The Market for Electronic Cash Cards," Research Discussion Papers 21/1998, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tarkka, J. & Shy, O., 1998. "The Market for Electronic Cash Cards," Bank of Finland - Studies in Economics and Finance 21/98, Bank of Finland. Research Department..
- Shy, Oz & Tarkka, Juha, 2002. "The Market for Electronic Cash Cards," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 299-314, May.

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