We develop a theoretical framework aimed to model the pricing of electronic money (electronic cash cards) and the market domain in which it will be used. We first calculate the fee structures of electronic cash- and charge-card industries for the monopoly and competitive cases. We show that the different market structures do not affect the domain of electronic cash cards and the displacement of currency in daily transactions. We provide a welfare analysis to determine whether a market equilibrium generates an underutilization or overutilization of the electronic cash cards relative to currency. Finally, we evaluate the threshold investment costs, both general and POS-specific, which would prevent the emergence of this industry.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)