To be able to describe informal rural credit markets, we apply the Brock and Scheinkman model of a price setting and capacity constrained oligopoly, where firms tacitly collude on monopoly pricing. We generalise the model to allow for third-degree price discrimination. The interval of aggregate lending capacity that supports a counter-intuitively increasing part of the equilibrium price-function is smaller than for the uniform price case.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Length: 39 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:2200
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway Phone: (+47)55589200 Fax: (+47)55589210 Email: Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment Q14 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Finance