This paper deals with a simple, Keynesian growth model. The main issue is whether Nash bargaining about wages may help to avoid cycles. Our result comes somewhat in the negative: Cycles may still persist. Their existence or emergence is related to violent investment behavior near the long-run, steady-growth path. Thus the prospects for sustained, stable growth appeat to hinge on whether intended investment near equilibrium is dominated by the realized savings or not.
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Length: 12 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1099
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles