Motivated by non-cooperative games we study repeated interaction among non-communicating agents, each dealing with his black of variables, each moving merely on the bases of his marginal payoff and its most recent change. Adjustment of play thus unfolds in parallel. Constrants are accommodated. The main issue is convergence to equilibrium.
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Length: 12 pages Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:0601
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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