This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Repullo, R.
Suarez, J.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, and showing how credibility fails when liquidity values are low, this paper identifies the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uninformed finance is optimal and explains why bank debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi in its series Papers with number 273.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:banita:273

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Banca d'Italia-Servizio Studi-Divisione Biblioteca e Pubblicazioni - Via N azionale, 91 -00184 Rome, Italy.
Web page: http://www.bancaditalia.it/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: BANKS; FINANCIAL MARKET; MORAL HAZARD;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Financial Intermediation and the Creation of Macroeconomic Risks," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nancy Huyghebaert & Linda Gucht & Cynthia Hulle, 2007. "The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 435-452, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li & Joanne Roberts, 2001. "Why do Governments Privatize," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 429, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Thierfelder, Felix, 2008. "Rollover risk in commercial paper markets and firms' debt maturity choice," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2008,05, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 1999. "Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 129, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Li, Yong & Aguilera, Ruth V., 2008. "Target Director Turnover in Acquisitions: A Conceptual Framework," Working Papers 08-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chemla, Gilles & Habib, Michel Antoine & Ljungqvist, Alexander P, 2002. "An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 3457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Stefan Arping & Sonia Falconieri, . "Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-036/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  9. Filippo Ippolito, 2005. "Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital Financing," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe12, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stefan ARPING, 2002. "Cannibalization & Incentives in Venture Financing," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised May 2002. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ivo Welch & Bris, Arturo, 2001. "The Optimal Concentration of Creditors," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1338, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Urs W. Birchler, 1999. "Bankruptcy Priority for Bank Deposits: a Contract Theoretic Explanation," Working Papers 00.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Kleimeier,Stefanie & William L. Megginson, 2002. "An empirical analysis of limited recourse project," Research Memoranda 066, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Galina Hale & João A. C. Santos, 2006. "Evidence on the costs and benefits of bond IPOs," Working Paper Series 2006-42, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  15. Issam Hallak, 2003. "Bank Loans Non-Linear Structure of Pricing: Empirical Evidence from Sovereign Debts," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/33, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
  16. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Documents de Travail 91, Banque de France. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Stefan ARPING, 2000. "Banking, Commerce, and Antitrust," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.22, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised May 2002. [Downloadable!]
  18. Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 1998. "Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 361-392, September. [Downloadable!]
  20. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2001. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1339, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.