Quantity Competition With Access Fees
AbstractWe analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal mairginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 358.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm
More information through EDIRC
OLIGOPOLIES ; PRICES ; GAME THEORY;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
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