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Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective

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Author Info
Mailath, G.J.
Morris, S.

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Abstract

In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 349.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:349

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm
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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY ; COORDINATION MECHANISMS ; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

Cited by:
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  1. Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ichiro Obara, . "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," CARESS Working Papres 99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Massimiliano Amarante, 2002. "Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring," Discussion Papers 0102-48, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  7. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Michihiro Kandori, 1999. "Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-45, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

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