Discrete Public Goods With Incomplete Information
AbstractThis paper investigates a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 348.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm
More information through EDIRC
GAME THEORY ; INFORMATION ; PUBLIC GOODS;
Other versions of this item:
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Temimi, Akram & Menezes, Flavio Marques, 1999. "Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 359, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro & Akram Temimi, 1998. "Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 98-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Flavio Menezes & Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Akram Temimi, 1999. "Discrete Public goods with incomplete information," Microeconomics 9901004, EconWPA, revised 06 Jul 1999.
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000.
"Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory,"
- Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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