This paper formalizes the link among electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and economic growth. The setup is a dynamic general equilibrium model of optimal growth and fiscal policy, in which fiscal policy is endogenized through a game between two political parties that can alternate in power.
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Paper provided by Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies in its series Athens University of Economics and Business with number
128.
Length: 19 pages Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:athebu:128
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior