The Maastricht Treaty assumes that a small "credible" group of countries will be able to adopt a single currency by the 1st of January, 1999, while the remainder retain their national monetary instruments. In this paper we accept the core/periphery distinction and examine the correlation and symmetry of shocks within and between groups. We discover that the core is no more an Optimal Currency Area than the periphery.
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Paper provided by American Institute for Contemporary German Studies- in its series Papers with number
22.
Length: 71 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:amiger:22
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions