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The German System of Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated

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Author Info

  • Wenger, E
  • Kaserer, C

Abstract

It has been discussed for a long time how managers of large corporations can be induced to act in the best interest of owners. According to conventional wisdom the related agency problems are much less important in Germany than in the UK or US. It is widely believed that industrial companies in Germany often have large blockholders, especially banks, which are toughly monitoring the management of their portfolio companies. It will be shown that this conventional wisdom is the result of a fundamental misunderstanding.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by American Institute for Contemporary German Studies- in its series Papers with number 14.

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Length: 78 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:amiger:14

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Postal: U.S.A.; Johns Hopkins University, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. 1400 16th Street, N.W. Suite 420 Washington, D.C. 20036-2217

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Keywords: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ; GERMANY;

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