Cooperation and Endogenous Identity
AbstractWe consider individual identity as abstract common social kinship, and model it as the fuzzy degree of membership to sets of individuals. We connect identity to propensity of cooperation as modeled by a Prisoners' Dilemma game played in pairs of individuals in a mixed population of cooperators and defectors. Unlike in standard evolutionary game theory, individuals are identified with set dependant strategies; their fuzzy identity is adjusted in reaction to success/insuccess as measured by relative payoff.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Economia e Dell'Impresa in its series Working Papers Series with number wp2012_26.rdf.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
fuzzy identity; cooperation; evolutionary game theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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