Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion
AbstractWe analyse how vertical or horizontal fiscal equalization affects the overprovision of local public goods due to vertical fiscal externality, when there is tax evasion. The regional governments overspending incentive is examined both in case of a fiscal equalization based on pretax earned income and reported taxable income.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Economics with number wp2011_06.rdf.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Fiscal federalism; Equalization; Marginal Cost of Public Funds; Tax evasion;
Other versions of this item:
- Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2012. "Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(3), pages 303-330, September.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-03-26 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2011-03-26 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-03-26 (Public Finance)
- NEP-URE-2011-03-26 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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