This paper examines the unfinished agenda of the governance structure for financial regulation and supervision in Europe. In this unfinished agenda, there are two opposite forces at play: one that fosters greater centralisation and another one that promotes decentralisation with co-operation. I try to cast some light on this debate, by arguing that a single market with a single currency does need some common rules, but does not require a single supervisor. I also argue that the possible centralisation of one function (lender of last resort) does not imply nor require the centralisation of other supervisory functions.
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