This paper analyzes the structure of cooperation between two large countries under one-sided incomplete information. Foreign government privately observes its likelihood of experiencing a political economy shock in each period. Home government’s prior belief about this likelihood is updated in a Bayesian fashion as the relationship continues. We show that the home government employs its privilege to design a contract so as to start with a few-goods-agreement, and increase the extent of cooperation gradually as its belief is favorably updated through periods. We also provide the conditions under which the home government makes the partner reveal its type in the beginning, or enables it to stay in a cooperative relationship without a complete revelation. As opposed to conventional approaches that relate gradualism with cost of liberalization, we show that asymmetric information provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to emerge.
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Paper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0905.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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