Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution
AbstractWe start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to “bad” alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0518.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS); the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme; the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme; the Enhancing Past Concessions scheme; the Honoring Past Concessions scheme; the Equal Area solution.;
Other versions of this item:
- Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, 08.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Anbarci, Nejat, 1993. "Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 245-58, February.
- Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1981.
"Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence,"
Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.
526, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986.
"An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-22, June.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Bigelow, John P., 1994. "The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 133-142, October.
- De Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009.
"Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," Working Papers 2009-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir & Knight, Brian, 2011.
"On the Selection of Arbitrators,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
8724, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sheng Guo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.