This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Division Rules, Network Formation, and the Evolution of Wealth

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nejat Anbarci () (Department of Economics, Florida International University)
John Boyd () (Department of Economics, Florida International University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We start with an initial wealth distribution. Each agent may establish at most one link with any agent in each period, yielding a surplus that agents split according to a uniform division rule. Wealth evolves by adding the payoffs to current wealth. Many long-run wealth distributions can arise, depending on the division rule and initial wealth distribution. The richest agent may remain richest or the poorest may become rich. Examing several division rules, we find that two factors determine the long-run wealth distribution: the size of the gain from a link, and the incentive to link to rich or poor.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/economics/wp2005/05-07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0507.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0507

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Miami, FL 33199
Phone: (305) 348-2316
Fax: (305) 348-1524
Web page: http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/economics/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Thompson).

Related research
Keywords: Network formation; long-run wealth distribution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2004. "The curse of wealth and power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 119-123, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.