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When Winning is the Only Thing: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Three-Candidate Spatial Voting Model

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Author Info
Richard A. Chisik () (Department of Economics, Florida International University)
Robert J. Lemke () (Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College)

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Abstract

It is well-known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections with an arbitrary number of candidates. Finally, when two candidates face the potential entrant of a third, we show that PSNE no longer exist, however, they do exist when the number of existing candidates is at least three.

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File URL: http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/economics/wp2004/04-07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2004
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0407.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare
Handle: RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0407

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Related research
Keywords: Voting; spatial equilibrium; location models; entry;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D0 - Microeconomics - - General
H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
R1 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics

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  1. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Eaton, B Curtis & Lipsey, Richard G, 1975. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 27-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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