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Is the Tariff the ‘Mother of Trusts’? Reciprocal Trade Liberalization with Multimarket Collusion

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Author Info
Constantinos Syropoulos () (Department of Economics, Florida International University)
Eric Bond (Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University)

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the impact of reciprocal trade liberalization on collusive conduct between domestic and foreign firms interacting in multiple markets. In our benchmark model, which deals with a symmetric homogenous-goods oligopoly, we show that, in the absence of trade barriers, an efficient collusive agreement involves equal division of the market in each country. When trade costs are introduced, the most profitable cartel minimizes trade costs and requires domestic firms to divide each market between them. However, such cartel agreements are difficult to sustain because they entail high deviation incentives; therefore, trade costs create a tension between the profitability of collusive agreements and incentive constraints. Further, when the full monopoly outcome is unsustainable under free trade, the relationship between global constrained efficient profits and symmetric trade costs is not monotonic. As a consequence, reciprocal trade liberalization may be welfare-reducing. We also extend the analysis to consider the implications of product differentiation.

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File URL: http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/economics/wp2003/03-10.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0310.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0310

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Related research
Keywords: tariffs; collusion; trade liberalization;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2001. "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1992. "Quantitative restrictions and tariffs with endogenous firm behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1627-1646, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fung, K C, 1992. "Economic Integration as Competitive Discipline," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 837-47, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 2001. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 343-55, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Constantin Colonescu & Nicolas Schmitt, 2003. "Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 175-192, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2004. "Cartel Stability and Economic Integration," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 432, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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