A note on global warfare in pharmaceutical patenting
AbstractThis paper revisits the question of whether global welfare is higher under a uniform world-wide system of pharmaceutical product patents or with international rules allowing low-income nations to free-ride on the discoveries of firms in rich nations. Key variables include the extent to which free-riding reduces the discovery of new drugs, the rent potential of rich as compared to poor nations, the ratio of the marginal utility of income in poor as compared to rich nations, and the competitive environment within which R&D decisions are made. Global welfare is found to be higher with free-riding over plausible discovery impairment and income utility combinations, especially when rent-seeking behavior leads to an expansion of R&D outlays exhausting appropriable rents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 03-11.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-08-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HEA-2004-08-09 (Health Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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