This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A note on global warfare in pharmaceutical patenting

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
F. M. Scherer
Abstract

This paper revisits the question of whether global welfare is higher under a uniform world-wide system of pharmaceutical product patents or with international rules allowing low-income nations to free-ride on the discoveries of firms in rich nations. Key variables include the extent to which free-riding reduces the discovery of new drugs, the rent potential of rich as compared to poor nations, the ratio of the marginal utility of income in poor as compared to rich nations, and the competitive environment within which R&D decisions are made. Global welfare is found to be higher with free-riding over plausible discovery impairment and income utility combinations, especially when rent-seeking behavior leads to an expansion of R&D outlays exhausting appropriable rents.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2003/wp03-11.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 03-11.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:03-11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 10 Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
Web page: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/wps/index.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry ; Patents;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Keith E. Maskus, 1997. "Implications of regional and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property Rights," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(5), pages 681-694, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, 2002. "Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 913-939, December.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.