Correspondence principles for concave orthogonal games
AbstractSilberberg  and Pauwels  have produced and clarified seminal results in the comparative statics of single-agent classical optimization problems. This paper extends Pauwels’ method to derive analogous results for stable Nath equilibria in a subclass of the widely used class of concave orthogonal games defined by Rosen . Application of these results to cost curve shifts in the asymmetric Cournot oligopoly immediately uncovers apparently new comparative statics results.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 90.
Date of creation: 1984
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-89, March.
- Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-14, May.
- Pauwels, Wilfried, 1979. "On some results in comparative statics analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 483-490, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.