The tax treatment of homeowners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation
AbstractThis paper analyzes the connection between the asymmetric tax treatment of homeowners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation using a quantitative overlapping generations general equilibrium model with housing and rental markets. Our model emphasizes the determinants of tenure choice (own vs. rent) and the household decision to supply housing services to the rental market. This formulation breaks the link between the rental price and the equilibrium interest rate and, hence, the aggregate supply of rental property responds differently to the direction of rental price changes, marginal tax rate changes, and maintenance cost changes. We show that the model replicates the key factors and the distributional patterns of ownership, house size, and landlords. The degree of progressivity in the income tax code has important implications for housing tenure and housing consumption. We find a movement toward a less progressive income tax code can generate sizeable increases in homeownership and welfare that result from the equilibrium effects and a portfolio reallocation mechanism absent in economies with a single asset (i.e. Conesa and Krueger (2006)). An examination of the removal of existing asymmetries in the tax code are found to have effects on housing that differ from those reported in the literature. We show that housing policy can increase the ownership rate of a particular segment of the population, but generate nontrivial distributional costs. The welfare increases are no larger than those found when the progressivity of the tax code is reduced.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2007-053.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga & Don Schlagenhauf, 2008. "The tax treatment of homeowners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation," Working Paper 2008-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-PUB-2008-01-05 (Public Finance)
- NEP-URE-2008-01-05 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga & Don Schlagenhauf, 2007.
"Accounting for changes in the homeownership rate,"
2007-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga & Don E. Schlagenhauf, 2009. "Accounting For Changes In The Homeownership Rate," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 677-726, 08.
- Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga, 2005. "Accounting for Changes in the Homeownership Rate," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 304, Society for Computational Economics.
- Yoshiro Miwa & Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga & Don E. Schlagenhauf, 2004. "Accounting for Changes in the Homeownership Rate," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-312, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Matthew Chambers & Carlos Garriga & Don E. Schlagenhauf, 2007. "Accounting for changes in the homeownership rate," Working Paper 2007-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Conesa, Juan Carlos & Krüger, Dirk, 2005.
"On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Conesa, Juan Carlos & Krueger, Dirk, 2006. "On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1425-1450, October.
- Conesa, Juan Carlos & Krueger, Dirk, 2005. "On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/10, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 2004. "On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code," Working Papers 131, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 2005. "On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code," NBER Working Papers 11044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 2002. "On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code," Centro de AltiÂsimos Estudios RiÂos PeÂ©rez(CAERP) 4, Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP).
- Edgar O. Olsen, 2001.
"Housing Programs for Low-Income Households,"
NBER Working Papers
8208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ana Castaneda & Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2003. "Accounting for the U.S. Earnings and Wealth Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 818-857, August.
- Gervais, Martin, 2002.
"Housing taxation and capital accumulation,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1461-1489, October.
- José-Víctor Ríos-Rull & Virginia Sánchez-Marcos, 2008. "An Aggregate Economy with Different Size Houses," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 705-714, 04-05.
- Gouveia, Miguel & Strauss, Robert P., 1994. "Effective Federal Individual Tax Functions: An Exploratory Empirical Analysis," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 47(2), pages 317-39, June Cita.
- James Berkovec & Don Fullerton, 1993.
"A General Equilibrium Model of Housing, Taxes, and Portfolio Choice,"
NBER Working Papers
3505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Berkovec, James & Fullerton, Don, 1992. "A General Equilibrium Model of Housing, Taxes, and Portfolio Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 390-429, April.
- Henderson, J. Vernon & Ioannides, Yannis M., 1989. "Dynamic aspects of consumer decisions in housing markets," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 212-230, September.
- Henderson, J Vernon & Ioannides, Yannis M, 1983. "A Model of Housing Tenure Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 98-113, March.
- Rosen, Harvey S & Rosen, Kenneth T, 1980. "Federal Taxes and Homeownership: Evidence from Time Series," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 59-75, February.
- Jonathan Halket & Santhanagopalan Vasudev, 2013.
"Online Appendix to "Saving Up or Settling Down: Home Ownership over the Life Cycle,"
12-89, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Jonathan Halket & Santhanagopalan Vasudev, 2014. "Saving Up or Settling Down: Home Ownership over the Life Cycle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(2), pages 345-366, April.
- Jonathan Halket, 2009.
"Home Ownership, Savings and Mobility Over The Life Cycle,"
2009 Meeting Papers
295, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jonathan Halket & Santhanagopalan Vasudev, 2012. "Home Ownership, Savings, and Mobility Over The Life Cycle," Economics Discussion Papers 712, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.