Policy evaluation in the presence of outsourcing: global competitiveness versus political feasibility
AbstractWe analyze the effects of outsourcing in the presence of a minimum wage by presenting a general-equilibrium model with an oligopolistic export sector and a competitive import-competing sector. An outsourcing tax is politically popular because it switches jobs to unemployed natives. It is also economically sound because it raises national income. An export subsidy may or may not be justified on welfare grounds. Increased international competition has no effect on the level of outsourcing, but the direction of its effect on unemployment and national income depends on the relative factor intensities of the two sectors. ; Original title: Oligopoly and outsourcing
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2005-074.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics and Politics, July 2007, 19(2), pp. 219-34
Other versions of this item:
- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Howard J. Wall, 2007. "Policy Evaluation In The Presence Of Outsourcing: Global Competitiveness Versus Political Feasibility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 219-234, 07.
- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Howard J . Wall, 2006. "Policy Evaluation in the Presence of Outsourcing : Global Competitiveness versus Political Feasibility," Working Papers 06-13 Classification-, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-01-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-01-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INT-2006-01-01 (International Trade)
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