This paper recognizes two main factors that cause the capital requirement to affect the weighted average cost of capital and hence the investment behavior of banks: underpriced debt resulting from the deposit insurance and information asymmetry between managers and the stock market. For a bank enjoying a low cost of debt (deposits), an increased proportion of equity financing raises the weighted average cost ofcapital. When the stock market underestimates the value of a bank due to information asymmetry, equity financing is expensive. This paper finds that banks constrained by the tightened capital requirement grew slower in 1991 and that information asymmetry as well as underpriced deposits played a role in explaining the slower growth.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number
1994-005.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, 1990.
"Do Firms Care Who Provides Their Financing?,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 63-104
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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