Entrepreneurial risk choice and credit market equilibria
AbstractWe analyze under what condiitons credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after previous failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks cannot perfectly observe the risk of previous projects, two equilibria may coexist: (1) an inefficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and has no access to finance after failure; and (2) a more efficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes high-risk projects and gets financed even after an endogenously determined number of failures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in its series Research Working Paper with number RWP 10-13.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-11-27 (Banking)
- NEP-ENT-2010-11-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-PPM-2010-11-27 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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