Bank monitoring mitigates agency problems: new evidence using the financial covenants in bank loan commitments
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in its series Research Working Paper with number 93-16.
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Morgan, D.P., 1995. "Bank Monitoring Mitigates Agency Problems: New Evidence Using the Financial Covenants in Bank Loan Commitments," Papers 95-12, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
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- Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans," Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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