This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Activist vs. non-activist monetary policy: optimal rules under extreme uncertainty

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Peter von zur Muehlen
Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimality of reactive feedback rules advocated by neo-Keynesians, and constant money growth rules proposed by monetarists. The basis for this controversy is not merely a disagreement concerning sources and impacts of uncertainty in the economy, but also an apparent fundamental difference in the attitude toward uncertainty about models. To address these differences, this paper compares the relative reactiveness of a monetary policy instrument to conditioning information for two starkly differing versions of model uncertainty about the model and the data driving it: Bayesian uncertainty that assumes known probability distributions for a model's parameters and the data Knightian uncertainty that does not. In the latter case, the policy maker copes with extreme uncertainty by playing a mental game against "natuare," using minmax strategies. Contrary to common intuition, extreme uncertainty about a model's parameters does not necessarily imply less responsiveness to conditioning information--here represented by the lagged gap between nominal income growth and its trend--and it certainly does not justify constancy of money growth except in an extreme version of Brainard's (1967) result. A partial constant growth rule can be derived in only one special case: if the conditioning variable in the feedback rule is also uncertain in either Bayesian or Knightian senses and the authority used Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio tests to distinguish noise from information with each new observation.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001/200102/200102abs.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001/200102/200102pap.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 2001-02.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2001-02

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20551
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/fedsorder.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Monetary policy Econometric models

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Willem H. Buiter, 1981. "The Superiority of Contingent Rules over Fixed Rules in Models with Rational Expectations," NBER Technical Working Papers 0009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Gordon, Robert J, 1977. "The Theory of Domestic Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 128-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Modigliani, Franco, 1977. "The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 1-19, March.
    Other versions:
  4. Swamy, P. A. V. B. & Tinsley, P. A., 1980. "Linear prediction and estimation methods for regression models with stationary stochastic coefficients," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-142, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Friedman, Milton, 1970. "A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 193-238, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Herschel I. Grossman, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Business Cycles, and Government Behavior," NBER Reprints 0155, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Craine, Roger, 1979. "Optimal monetary policy with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 59-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Howitt, Peter W, 1981. "Activist Monetary Policy under Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(2), pages 249-69, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tinsley, P. & Von Zur Muehlen, P., 1981. "A maximum probability approach to short-run policy," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 31-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Barro, Robert J., 1976. "Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Taylor, John B, 1975. "Monetary Policy during a Transition to Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(5), pages 1009-21, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. P.A.V.B. Swamy & J.R. Barth & P.A. Tinsley, 1980. "The rational expectations approach to economic modelling," Special Studies Papers 143, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Other versions:
  14. Craine, Roger & Havenner, Arthur & Berry, James, 1978. "Fixed Rules vs. Activism in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(5), pages 769-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. J.H. Kalchbrenner & P.A. Tinsley, 1976. "On the use of optimal control in the design of monetary policy," Special Studies Papers 76, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 900 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.