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The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements

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  • Paul H. Kupiec
  • James M. O'Brien

Abstract

This paper develops a model of bank behavior that focuses on the interaction between the incentives created by fixed-rate deposit insurance and a bank's choice of its loan portfolio and its market-traded financial instruments. The model is used to analyze the consequences of the Federal Reserve Board's proposed pre-commitment approach (PCA) for setting market risk capital requirements for bank trading portfolios. Under the PCA, a bank determines its own market risk capital requirement and is subject to a known regulatory penalty should its trading activities generate subsequent losses that exceed its market risk capital commitment.

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File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199714/199714abs.html
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File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199714/199714pap.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1997-14.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-14

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Keywords: Capital market ; Risk;

References

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  1. Gennotte, Gerard & Pyle, David, 1991. "Capital controls and bank risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 805-824, September.
  2. Stulz, ReneM., 1982. "Options on the minimum or the maximum of two risky assets : Analysis and applications," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 161-185, July.
  3. Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993. " An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-42, September.
  4. Johnson, Herb, 1987. "Options on the Maximum or the Minimum of Several Assets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 277-283, September.
  5. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Senbet, Lemma W., 1991. "Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 895-915, September.
  7. Tim S. Campbell & Yuk-Shee Chan & Anthony M. Marino, 1990. "An incentive based theory of bank regulation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
  8. Yuk-Shee Chan & Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Finance 0411018, EconWPA.
  9. Jin-Chuan Duan & Jean-Guy Simonato, 1995. "Empirical Martingale Simulation for Asset Prices," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-43, CIRANO.
  10. Paul H. Kupiec, 1995. "Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement models," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  11. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1996. "The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 160-183, April.
  12. Dimson, Elroy & Marsh, Paul, 1995. " Capital Requirements for Securities Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(3), pages 821-51, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Esty, Benjamin C., 1998. "The impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 189-218, February.
  2. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
  3. Dr Arup Daripa & Dr. Simone Varotto, 2004. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital," ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance icma-dp2004-12, Henley Business School, Reading University.
  4. Alistair Milne & A Elizabeth Whalley, 1999. "Bank capital and risk taking," Bank of England working papers 90, Bank of England.
  5. Xavier Freixas, 2003. "An overall perspective on banking regulation," Economics Working Papers 664, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143.
  7. Borio, Claudio & Tsatsaronis, Kostas, 2004. "Accounting and prudential regulation: from uncomfortable bedfellows to perfect partners?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 111-135, September.
  8. Nachane, D M & Narain, Aditya & Ghosh, Saibal & Sahoo, Satyananda, 2001. "Regulating Market Risks in Banks: A Comparison of Alternate Regulatory Regimes," MPRA Paper 17148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Jackson, Patricia & Perraudin, William, 2000. "Regulatory implications of credit risk modelling," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 1-14, January.
  10. David T. Llewellyn, 2001. "A regulatory regime for financial stability," Working Papers 48, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  11. Lucas, Andr‚, 1998. "Testing backtesting : an evaluation of the Basle guidelines for backtesting internal risk management models of banks," Serie Research Memoranda 0001, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  12. Milne, Alistair, 2002. "Bank capital regulation as an incentive mechanism: Implications for portfolio choice," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-23, January.
  13. Jezabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 37-56.
  14. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Solvency regulations and the management of banking risks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 981-990, April.

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